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I. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of philosophers and legal theorists who have
thought about the issue agree that there is such a thing as a moral right to
privacy. However, there is little or no theoretical consensus about the
nature of this right. According to reductionists, the right to privacy
amounts to nothing more than a cluster of property rights and rights over
* Associate Professor, Philosophy, University of California, San Diego. I presented a
shorter version of this paper at a philosophy department colloquium at the University
of Utah in January 2007. Many thanks to those who participated in that animated
discussion, including Margaret Battin, Matt Haber, Eric Hutton, Lex Newman, and Mariam
Thalos. I also presented a version of the paper at a roundtable on privacy organized by
the Institute for Law & Philosophy at the University of San Diego in April 2007. Many
thanks to the Institute for inviting me to present the paper at the roundtable, and to all the
roundtable participants for their incisive questions and constructive feedback,
particularly Larry Alexander, Daniel Attas, David Brink, Dale Dorsey, Amitai Etzioni,
James Griffin, Kenneth Himma, Adam Kolber, Evan Tsen Lee, Orly Lobel, Adam D.
Moore, Alan Rubel, Steve Smith, and Daniel Solove. I am also very grateful to Daniel
Attas, Dana Nelkin, and Alan Rubel for providing me with insightful and extensive
comments on the paper. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the San Diego Law
Review for their invaluable editorial assistance.
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the person, and therefore plays no autonomous explanatory role in moral
theory.1 Among nonreductionists, there are numerous accounts of the right
to privacy. For one group of nonreductionists (perhaps the majority) the
right to privacy is properly understood as a right of control, a form of
autonomy. Within this group, some think that the right to privacy is the
right to control information about oneself,2 while others insist that it is
the right to control access to oneself.3 For another group of nonreductionists,
the right to privacy is the right to cognitive inaccessibility, physical
inaccessibility, or both.4 Though these are by far the most widely adopted
nonreductionist accounts of the relevant right, they are by no means the
only ones currently on offer. There are hybrid accounts proposing that
the right to privacy is a cluster of various rights of control,5 or a cluster
of various rights of control and restricted access.6 Further, according to an
influential “information-based” account, the right to privacy is defined as
the right that others not possess undocumented personal information
about the rightholder.7
The purpose of this paper is to bring order to this theoretical chaos. In
my view, none of these accounts of the right to privacy is accurate. As I
will argue, we are better served by a completely different theoretical
description of the relevant right. It is my hope that greater philosophical
clarity in this area of ethics will lead to a more careful appreciation of
the value of the right to privacy, as well as legislation and judicial
reasoning that is more carefully crafted to protect against violations of
the right.
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND
RISK 117, 125–26 (William Parent ed., 1986); Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by
“Right to Privacy”?, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1, 18 (1959).
2. See CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140–41 (1970); ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Elizabeth L. Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and
Selective Disclosure, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 56, 56 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1971); Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 76
(1978); Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215, 215–16
(2003).
3. See Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra note 2,
at 149, 149; Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 280–
81 (1974); James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 323
(1975); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26,
28, 32 (1976); Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 315
(1975).
4. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS 16–17 (1988); Roland Garrett, The
Nature of Privacy, 18 PHIL. TODAY 263, 264 (1974); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422–23 (1980).
5. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 41 (1992).
6. JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY 53, 66 (1997).
7. W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 269
(1983) [hereinafter Parent, Privacy]; W.A. Parent, Recent Work on the Concept of
Privacy, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 341, 346 (1983) [hereinafter Parent, Recent Work].
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The paper is organized as follows. In Part II, I place the controversy
over the nature of the right to privacy within the context of the
Hohfeldian theory of rights developed by Thomson. In Part III, I describe
some well-known paradigm cases in which the right to privacy is
infringed, and explain how standard theories accommodate these examples.
In Part IV, I consider counterexamples to the standard theories. In Part
V, I return to Thomson’s seminal article, The Right to Privacy, for clues
to the nature of the right to privacy. As I will argue, the examples
Thomson uses in defense of reductionism (ironically) provide the
inspiration for a novel nonreductionist account that is theoretically
superior to the standard views. I call this account the “Barrier Theory.”
I then conclude with a summary of the main points of the paper and a
brief discussion of the possible ways in which the Barrier Theory might
contribute to answering some pressing legal questions.
II. RIGHTS
According to Thomson, whose theory of rights is heavily indebted to
Hohfeld, rights are either simple or complex. Complex rights, which
Thomson calls “cluster-rights,” are combinations of simple rights.
Simple rights, which are not themselves combinations of other rights,
come in four varieties: claims, privileges, powers, and immunities. For
X to have a claim against Y that P is for Y to be under a duty toward X,
namely the duty that Y discharges if and only if P. For example, I have a
claim against you that you not smash my computer inasmuch as you
have a duty toward me of not smashing my computer.8 For X to have a
privilege as regards Y of letting it be the case that P is for X not to be
under the duty towards Y that X discharges if and only if not-P. For
example, I have a privilege as regards you of parking behind your car
inasmuch as I do not have a duty toward you of not parking behind your
car.9 For X to have a power as regards Y is for X to have “an ability to
cause, by an act of [X’s] own, an alteration in [Y’s] rights . . . .”10 For
example, “by virtue of owning [a certain] typewriter, A is able to make it
the case, by an act of his own, that A himself loses a claim against B that
B not use it: A does this if he gives B permission to use it.”11 Finally,
8.
9.
10.
11.

JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 41 (1990).
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 57.
Id.
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“for X to have an immunity against Y just is for Y to lack a power as
regards X.”12 For example, “[y]ou . . . have an immunity against me if I
lack the ability to make you cease to own your typewriter.”13
Among the more important cluster-rights are what Thomson calls
“liberties.”14 For X to be at liberty to do A (or to have the liberty to do
A) is (i) for X to have a privilege as regards everyone of doing A, and (ii)
for X to have a claim against all others that they not interfere in certain
sorts of ways with X doing A. Thus, I am at liberty to (or have the
liberty to) read Middlemarch in my living room inasmuch as (i) I am not
under a duty toward anyone of not reading Middlemarch in my living
room and (ii) everyone else is under a duty toward me of not interfering
(say, by removing my glasses) with my reading Middlemarch in my
living room.
Claims are the most important of the simple rights.15 Importantly,
Thomson distinguishes between claim-infringements and claim-violations.
For Y to infringe X’s claim against Y that P is for Y to make it the case
that not-P. For example, you infringe my claim against you that you not
smash my computer if you do indeed smash my computer. To violate a
claim is to infringe it impermissibly.16 So all claim-violations are ipso
facto claim-infringements. It is a substantive thesis in moral theory, one
that Thomson (in my view, rightly) defends, that not all claim-infringements
are also claim-violations; it is possible to infringe a claim without violating
it. Suppose, for example, that a master terrorist has hidden the only key
that could disable a nuclear device that is about to go off in Manhattan in
my computer. By smashing my computer (which is the only way to get
at the key in time to prevent the nuclear explosion), you definitely
infringe the claim I have against you that you not smash my computer.
But your infringement of this claim of mine is morally permissible or
justifiable, perhaps even morally required.
Thomson also says (again, in my view, rightly) that claims vary in
strictness or stringency. In general, the more stringent the claim, the greater
the required increment of good needed to justify infringing it. For
example, my right against you that you not kill me is more stringent than
my right against you that you not smash my computer; the good of
saving an innocent person’s life is great enough to justify infringing the

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 53–54.
Hohfeld calls them “right[s] in the strictest sense.” WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 36 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., Yale University Press
1923).
16. THOMSON, supra note 8, at 122.
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latter, but not great enough to justify infringing the former.17 Thomson
goes further in endorsing what she calls the “Aggravation Principle”:
If X has a claim against Y that Y do alpha, then the worse Y makes
things for X if Y fails to do alpha, the more stringent X’s claim
against Y that Y do alpha . . . .18
Thus, it is not merely that the stringency of a claim varies with the
amount of good needed to justify infringing it; a claim’s stringency also
varies “with how bad its infringement would be for the claim holder.”19
Thus, it is in large part because infringing my claim to not be killed
would make things worse for me than would infringing my claim to not
have my computer smashed, that the former claim is more stringent than
the latter.
Finally, it is an important part of the Hohfeld-Thomson theory of
rights that there are different ways in which a person can cease to have a
right.20 One way to divest oneself of a right is by waiving it. For
example, I might waive my claim against you that you not eat my salad
by explicitly granting you permission to eat it, or I might waive my
claim against Officer Smith that she not search my house by explicitly
consenting to the search. Another way to lose a right is by forfeiting it.
For example, a villainous aggressor who attempts to kill you forfeits her
claim against you that you not kill her (as the only means of preventing
her from killing you).
It is in the overall context of the Hohfeld-Thomson theory of rights
that I wish to discuss the nature of the right to privacy. Is the right to
privacy a claim, privilege, power, or immunity? If it is a claim, what
conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for its
infringement? If it is not a claim, is it a cluster-right, such as a liberty,
that results from the combination of simple rights? If it is a cluster-right,
what exactly are its components?
III. CASES
In order to make progress in answering these questions, it helps, I
think, to consider paradigm cases in which the right to privacy is (at
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 361.
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least) infringed (or violated) and paradigm cases in which it is not. And,
in respect of cases, there is no better source than Thomson’s The Right to
Privacy.
To begin, consider the following pair of cases adapted from Thomson:
The Loud Fight
A married couple, X and Y, are having a fight in their house,
shouting at each other as loud as they can; unfortunately, they have
not thought to close the windows, so that they can easily be heard
from the street outside. As it happens, Smith, while watering his
flowers across the street, hears what X and Y say.
The Quiet Fight
The same married couple, X and Y, are having a quiet fight, behind
closed windows, and cannot be heard by the normal person who
passes by; however, Jones across the street trains an amplifier on
their house, by means of which he can hear what they say; and he
does this in order to hear what they say.21
As Thomson sees it, Jones, but not Smith, infringes the right to privacy
possessed by the married couple.
And consider also the famous cases of the pornographic picture and
the subway map:
The Pornographic Picture
Hugh owns a pornographic picture that he does not want anyone
else to see. He locks it in his wall-safe and only takes it out at night
or after pulling down his shades. Black hears about the picture and
wants to see it. Black trains his X-ray device on Hugh’s wall-safe
and looks at the picture.22
The Subway Map
There is a subway map on the wall at the Harvard Square T-stop.
Larry doesn’t want White to see the map, and so covers it up with
his raincoat. White trains his (portable) X-ray device on the raincoat
and manages to look at the subway map.23
Again, as seems clear, in training his X-ray device to look at the picture
in Hugh’s wall-safe, Black infringes Hugh’s right to privacy; but in
21.
22.
23.

778

Adapted from Thomson, supra note 1, at 117–18.
Adapted from Thomson, supra note 1, at 120.
Adapted from Thomson, supra note 1, at 122.

RICKLESS POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC

[VOL. 44: 773, 2007]

2/7/2008 2:57:26 PM

The Right to Privacy Unveiled
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

training his X-ray device to look at the subway map, White does not
infringe Larry’s right to privacy.
Now what, in these cases, accounts for the fact that there is (or is not)
an infringement of the right to privacy? One of Thomson’s insights is
that answering this question will help us identify and distinguish the
right to privacy.
Consider the most popular nonreductionist theories and what they tell
us about these cases. Within the Hohfeld-Thomson theory of rights,
“control-based” accounts of the right to privacy classify it as a liberty,
that is, as a cluster-right that includes (i) a privilege as regards everyone
of deciding (and carrying out the decision) to hide personal matters
(whether in the form of one’s body or mind, one’s corporeal or mental
acts, or facts about oneself) from others, and (ii) a claim against all
others that they not interfere in certain sorts of ways with this decision
and its implementation. On this sort of view, the problem in The Quiet
Fight is that Jones has infringed the married couple’s right to privacy by
infringing their claim of noninterference—in the way of preventing them
from carrying out their decision that others shall not access the sounds
they emit during their conversation or acquire the information contained
in those sounds. Similarly, on this sort of view, the problem in The
Pornographic Picture is that Black has infringed Hugh’s claim of
noninterference with the implementation of his decision that others shall
not look at, and thereby gain information about, the contents of his wallsafe.
By contrast, “accessibility-based” theories classify the right to privacy
as no more than a claim against others that they not have the ability to
experience (or obtain information about) such personal facts or states of
affairs. On such views, the problem in The Quiet Fight is that, because
he can train an effective amplifying device on the married couple’s
home, Jones has infringed their claim that others not have the ability to
experience, and thereby gain information about, their conversation.
Further, the problem in The Pornographic Picture is that, because he can
train an effective X-ray device on Hugh’s wall-safe, Black has infringed
Hugh’s claim that others not have the ability to experience, and thereby
gain information about, the contents of his wall-safe.
According to accessibility-based theories, it is possible to explain the
fact that Smith does not infringe the married couple’s right to privacy in
The Loud Fight by appealing to the concept of claim-waiving. By
raising their voices above a certain decibel level and omitting to close
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their windows, the married couple have voluntarily divested themselves
of the claim that passersby not possess the ability to hear what they are
saying to each other. Control-based theories offer a somewhat different
explanation for the fact that Smith does not infringe the married couple’s
right to privacy. They can say that, by stepping outside his house and
watering his flowers, Smith interferes neither with the married couple’s
decisions nor with the implementation of those decisions. Given that Smith
does not infringe the married couple’s claim of decisional noninterference,
and given that privileges are not the sorts of rights that can be infringed,
it follows that Smith infringes no right that is part of the cluster-right
that is the married couple’s right to privacy.
Control- and accessibility-based theories treat The Subway Map in yet
another way. The issue here concerns the zone over which the relevant
agents have the right of control. According to both sorts of theories, the
right to privacy covers access to, or decisional control over, a zone that
includes personal or intimate matters, but not items in the public domain.
The fact that White does not infringe Larry’s right to privacy in The
Subway Map is to be explained, not by adverting to Larry’s waiving of a
claim or to the fact that White’s X-ray device does not interfere with
Larry’s decision to keep others from looking at the map, but rather by
adverting to the fact that the map does not fall within Larry’s zone of
privacy.
According to a somewhat different, but influential, “informationbased” view defended by Parent, the right to privacy is the claim that others
not possess undocumented personal information about the claimholder.24
Parent understands personal information to consist of “facts which most
persons in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves (except
to close friends, family . . . ) or of facts about which a particular individual
is acutely sensitive and which he therefore does not choose to reveal
about himself . . . .”25 He defines documented information as “information
belonging to the public record.”26 Thus, for Parent, Jones infringes the
married couple’s right to privacy in The Quiet Fight because, thanks to
his amplifier, he now possesses information about the couple that does
not belong to the public record and that they have chosen not to reveal to
anyone. And Black infringes Hugh’s right to privacy in The Pornographic
Picture inasmuch as, thanks to his X-ray device, he now possesses
undocumented personal information about Hugh (concerning Hugh’s
24. See generally Parent, Privacy, supra note 7, at 269; Parent, Recent Work, supra
note 7, at 346.
25. Parent, Privacy, supra note 7, at 270.
26. Id. This would include information “in court proceedings, newspapers, or
other documents available for public inspection.” Parent, Recent Work, supra note 7, at
347.
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possessions and viewing habits). By contrast, since the contents of the
married couple’s conversation are “available for public inspection” in
The Loud Fight, Smith does not infringe the couple’s right to privacy
when he acquires personal information about the couple as a result of
walking outside to water his flowers. And since the information contained
in the subway map is part of the public record, White does not infringe
Larry’s right to privacy in the course of using his X-ray device to look at
the map through Larry’s raincoat.
Thomson, following the lead of Davis, defends a reductionist account
of the right to privacy.27 She begins by distinguishing, nonexhaustively,
between two kinds of rights from which the right to privacy derives and
to which it may be reduced: property rights and rights over the person.
Property rights in respect of X are cluster-rights that include both
positive rights (or privileges), such as “the right to sell [X] to whomever
you like, the right to give [X] away, the right to tear [X], the right to look
at [X],” and negative rights (or claims), such as “the right that others
shall not sell [X] or give [X] away or tear [X].”28 Rights over the person
include such “un-grand” rights as the claim that others shall not stroke
one’s knee, the claim that others shall not cut off one’s hair while one is
asleep, and the claim that others shall not paint one’s elbows green.29
Thomson hypothesizes that one’s property right with respect to X
includes not only the privilege of hiding X from others and the claim that
others not interfere with one’s hiding X from others, but also the claim
that others not look at, listen to, or otherwise experience X. It is, she
contends, the fact that Black manages to look at the contents of Hugh’s
wall-safe in The Pornographic Picture that explains why Black infringes
Hugh’s right to privacy; for Hugh’s right includes the claim against
Black that Black not look at Hugh’s picture. By contrast, the fact that
White does not infringe Larry’s right to privacy in The Subway Map is to
be explained by the fact that Larry does not have a claim that White not
look at the map, a fact itself explained by the fact that Larry does not
own the map—a piece of public or government property.
Thomson also hypothesizes that one’s right over the person includes
among its un-grand claims the claim that others not look at one’s body
(or its parts) and the claim that others not listen to the sounds emitted by

27.
28.
29.

For more on Davis’s theories, see generally Davis, supra note 1.
Thomson, supra note 1, at 120–21.
Id. at 126.
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one’s body (or its parts). It is, she argues, the fact that Jones actually
listens in on the married couple’s animated conversation in The Quiet
Fight that explains why Jones infringes the couple’s right to privacy; for
the couple’s right includes the claim against Jones that Jones not listen to
the sound of their voices. By contrast, the fact that Smith does not infringe
the married couple’s right to privacy in The Loud Fight is to be explained
by the fact that, by raising their voices and not closing their doors, the
couple waived their claim that Smith not listen to them.
Thomson then defends a “simplifying hypothesis” according to which
“the right to privacy is itself a cluster of rights, . . . [that] intersects with
the cluster of rights which the right over the person consists in and also
with the cluster of rights which owning property consists in.”30 On her
view, there is no autonomous right to privacy distinct from other rights.
Thus, in The Pornographic Picture, it is not because Black infringes
Hugh’s right to privacy that Black infringes Hugh’s property claim that
Black not look at Hugh’s picture; rather, it is because Black infringes
Hugh’s property claim that he infringes Hugh’s right to privacy.
Similarly, in The Quiet Fight, it is not because Jones infringes the married
couple’s right to privacy that Jones infringes the couple’s claim that he
not listen to them; rather, it is because Jones infringes the couple’s claim
that he not listen to them that he infringes their right to privacy.31
IV. COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE STANDARD ACCOUNTS
Standard nonreductionist accounts of the right to privacy enjoy a
measure of success with regard to the task of explaining why there is (or
is not) an infringement of the right in some central paradigm cases.
However, there are other paradigm cases that point up significant weaknesses
in the standard nonreductionist theories.
Parent, following Thomson, points out (in my view, rightly) that
control-based theories of the right to privacy stumble over what he calls
“the threatened loss counterexample.” Parent puts the point this way:
The Threatened Loss Counterexample
Suppose A invents a fantastic X-ray device that enables him to look right
through walls. A then focuses the device on my home but refuses to use it.
Since he certainly has the power to find out everything that I am doing in my
home it cannot be said that I any longer enjoy control over personal information
about myself vis-à-vis A—at least I don’t in regard to activities done at [my]

30.
31.
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home. Still A has not invaded my privacy. He doesn’t do that until he actually
looks through his device.32

The Threatened Loss Counterexample stresses the fact that the mere
existence of an effective X-ray device in the hands of someone else is
sufficient to deprive me of the power to determine who shall (and who
shall not) acquire personal information about me and who shall (and who
shall not) experience personal facts about me. By virtue of possessing such
a powerful X-ray device, A interferes with the implementation of my
decision that no one outside my house shall learn or experience what it is
that I do behind closed doors. Thus, A infringes a claim to decisional
noninterference that control-based theories identify as one of the rights
that combine to form the cluster-right that is the right to privacy.
Control-based theories therefore predict that A infringes my right to
privacy even when he does not look through his X-ray device and so
neither experiences nor acquires information about what I do behind
closed doors. But this is a counterintuitive result: A does not infringe
my right to privacy unless he actually sees me (or gains information
about me) with the help of his X-ray device.
As Parent (also, in my view, rightly) points out, the same counterexample
works against accessibility-based theories as well. According to these
theories, the right to privacy is a claim against others that they not have
the ability to experience (or obtain information about) personal facts
or states of affairs involving the claimholder. It is the possibility of
accessing—not the actual accessing of—personal information by others
that accessibility-based theorists find disturbing. Consequently, on such
views, it is again sufficient for infringement of my right to privacy that A
possess the capacity, in the form of his X-ray device, to access personal
information about me that I have chosen to keep from him. Hence,
accessibility-based theories also predict the independently counterintuitive

32. Parent, Recent Work, supra note 7, at 344. In this, Parent is following Thomson,
who writes:
If my neighbor invents an X-ray device which enables him to look through
walls, then I should imagine I thereby lose control over who can look at me:
going home and closing the doors no longer suffices to prevent others from
doing so. But my right to privacy is not violated [or infringed] until my
neighbor actually does train the device on the wall of my house. It is the actual
looking that violates [or at least infringes] it, not the acquisition of power to
look.
Thomson, supra note 1, at 125–26 n.1.
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result that A infringes my right to privacy even as his powerful X-ray
device remains idle.
Not surprisingly, Parent’s own information-based account of the right
to privacy is not vulnerable to The Threatened Loss Counterexample.
For Parent, my right to privacy is not infringed in the case unless A
actually possesses undocumented personal information about me. Since A
has not looked through his X-ray device, he possesses no such information,
and hence has not infringed my right to privacy. But Parent’s own theory is
hardly immune to counterexample. In fact, there are strong reasons to
think that the possession of undocumented personal information about a
person is neither necessary nor sufficient to constitute an infringement of
her right to privacy.
Here is a counterexample to the necessity claim, one that focuses on
whether personal information must be undocumented in order for
possession of it to count as an infringement of the right to privacy:
The Ex-Nazi
Goldberg trains his powerful X-ray device on Rudolf’s wall-safe
and learns from reading the papers therein that Rudolf was once a
member of the Nazi party. As it happens, Goldberg could have
learned the very same information about Rudolf by reading old
issues of Der Völkischer Beobachter in the public library, but did
not do so.
In The Ex-Nazi, Goldberg clearly infringes Rudolf’s right to privacy
despite the fact that he learns no information that is not already a part of
the public record. It follows that the possession of undocumented
information about X is not necessary for infringing X’s right to privacy.
A different counterexample brings out the fact that the possession of
undocumented personal information about X is not sufficient for
infringing X’s right to privacy:
The Innocent Gossip
Sally has trained her powerful X-ray device on Rudolf, and has
learned a piece of undocumented personal information about him,
namely, that he likes to solve Sudoku puzzles. As it happens, James
and Sally love to gossip and share information. Sally tells James that
Rudolf is addicted to Sudoku puzzles. When James asks Sally how
she knows this, she replies (falsely) that Rudolf admitted it to her.
In The Innocent Gossip, it is clear that James now has undocumented
personal information about Rudolf. And yet, as is also clear, it is not the
case that James has infringed (or is infringing) Rudolf’s right to privacy
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by virtue of the fact that he now knows that Rudolf likes to solve Sudoku
puzzles. It follows that the possession of undocumented personal information
about X is not sufficient for infringing X’s right to privacy.
Given the problems faced by standard nonreductionist accounts of the
right to privacy, it is well worth asking whether Thomson’s reductionist
account of the right fares any better. The answer, I believe, is no. The
central thesis of Thomson’s account is that persons have such rights as
the claim to not be looked at or listened to and the claim that one’s
property not be looked at or listened to. Though this thesis promises to
explain why Hugh’s and the married couple’s right to privacy is infringed in
The Pornographic Picture and The Quiet Fight, and though it does so
without succumbing to any of the counterexamples to standard
nonreductionist theories, it is vulnerable to a different class of counterexamples.
Consider the following case:
The Pornographic Tornado
A tornado demolishes Hugh’s mansion, picks up the wall-safe, and
drops it onto the ground in such a way that the pornographic picture
pops out and lands face up in the middle of the Walk of Fame on
Hollywood Boulevard. Thomas, a tourist who is searching for the
Star of Igor Stravinsky, spots the picture and looks at it.
It is clear that Thomas does not infringe Hugh’s right to privacy by
looking at Hugh’s pornographic picture on Hollywood Boulevard. The
picture is on the ground, face up, in plain sight. There is no one else
around. The picture seemingly materializes out of nowhere. It seems as
plain as plain can be that Thomas commits no wrong—not even pro
tanto—in looking at the picture. But if Hugh’s right to privacy includes
the claim that others not look at his picture, then Thomas has indeed
infringed that right.33 I conclude that Thomson’s reductionist theory
delivers the wrong result in The Pornographic Tornado.
And it is not just with respect to cases involving private property that
Thomson’s theory fails: it also fails in cases involving what she thinks of
as rights over the person. Consider, for example, a variant on the case of
The Quiet Fight:

33.

Hugh certainly has neither waived nor forfeited the relevant claim.
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The Accidentally Amplified Quiet Fight
Our married couple, X and Y, are having another quiet fight behind
closed doors. But this time an unanticipated gust of wind sweeps
through the house, knocking down the front door, carrying and
amplifying the couple’s voices so that Stuart, who is washing his
car in his driveway across the street, hears at least some of what X
and Y have been saying.
Again, it is clear that Stuart does not infringe the married couple’s right
to privacy by hearing and listening to part of their conversation. But if
the couple’s right to privacy includes the claim that others not listen to
them, then Stuart has indeed infringed that right.34 So Thomson’s theory
delivers the wrong result in The Accidentally Amplified Quiet Fight as
well.
V. THE BARRIER THEORY
What do The Quiet Fight and The Pornographic Picture have in common
that distinguishes them both from The Accidentally Amplified Quiet
Fight and The Pornographic Tornado? Ironically enough, Thomson herself
provides us with a valuable clue. She explains the point that “[w]here
our rights in this area do lie is, I think, here: [(i)] we have a right that
certain steps shall not be taken to find out facts, and [(ii)] we have a right
that certain uses shall not be made of facts.”35 Leaving aside part (ii) of
this statement (a part to which I shall return), Thomson’s point in part (i)
is that the right to privacy is a claim against others that they not use
certain sorts of means to experience or discover personal facts about the
claimholder. I propose to turn this insight into a more precise nonreductionist
account of the right to privacy, one that promises to avoid all the
problematic counterexamples discussed thus far.
Let us go back to Thomson’s initial examples. In The Quiet Fight the
married couple have retreated behind the walls, closed windows, and
closed doors of their house to have a private conversation. The walls, as
well as the closed windows and doors, represent a barrier or obstacle in
the way of those (such as passersby) who might otherwise be in a
position to hear what X and Y are saying to each other. By training his
amplifier on the couple’s house, Jones learns or experiences personal
facts about them by virtue of the fact that he has breached this barrier.
In The Pornographic Picture, Hugh has placed the picture in his wall34.
35.
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safe in order to keep others from seeing it. The fact that the wall-safe is
locked and cannot be opened by someone who is ignorant of the relevant
combination represents a barrier or obstacle in the way of those (such as
friends, plumbers, and electricians) who might otherwise be in a position
to look at the picture when Hugh has invited them into his house. By
training his X-ray machine on Hugh’s wall-safe, Black learns or experiences
a personal fact about Hugh (namely, that Hugh has a pornographic
picture in his safe) by virtue of the fact that he (Black) has breached this
barrier. Contrast both of these cases with The Loud Fight and The Subway
Map. In The Loud Fight, Smith breaches no barrier when the sound
waves emitted by the couple reach his ears as he is watering the flowers
in his front yard. And in The Subway Map, although White does breach
a barrier by using his X-ray device to look through Larry’s raincoat at
the map, he does not thereby learn or experience any personal fact about
Larry.
This description of Thomson’s examples suggests the following
nonreductionist hypothesis:
The Barrier Theory
For X to have a right to privacy against Y is for X to have a claim
against Y that Y not learn or experience some personal fact about X
by breaching a barrier used by X to keep others from learning or
experiencing some personal fact about X.
As should be clear, the Barrier Theory is immune to the counterexamples
that bedevil the standard reductionist and nonreductionist theories. For
example, the Threatened Loss Counterexample poses no difficulty
whatever for the Barrier Theorist. The reason for this is that the mere
existence of an effective X-ray device that is trained on my home does
not constitute an infringement of the claim that the Barrier Theory takes
to be definitive of my right to privacy. In order to infringe this claim, A
would actually have to use the device to see me through the walls of my
house. The Barrier Theory can also explain why Thomas does not infringe
Hugh’s right to privacy in The Pornographic Tornado and why Stuart
does not infringe the married couple’s right to privacy in The Accidentally
Amplified Quiet Fight. For, in looking at Hugh’s pornographic picture
on the Walk of Fame, Thomas breaches no barrier being used by Hugh
to prevent others from experiencing the picture; and in hearing part of
the married couple’s conversation, Stuart breaches no barrier that the
couple are using to prevent others from experiencing their altercation.
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There are various questions that might be pressed on a proponent of
the Barrier Theory. One question is whether it is required that the barrier
that must be breached as a condition of the infringement of someone’s
right to privacy be solid. Although the right-to-privacy infringement cases
considered thus far involve the breaching of a solid barrier, it is easy to
see that this is an irrelevant feature of the cases. For consider the following
case:
The Man in the Bushes
[X and Y, a married couple,] have to talk over some personal matters. It is most
convenient [for them] to meet in the park, and [they] do so, taking a bench far
from the path since [they] don’t want to be overheard. It strikes a man [say,
Brown] to want to know what [they] are saying to each other in that heated
fashion, so he creeps around in the bushes behind [them] and crouches back of
the bench to listen.36

As seems clear, by creeping through the bushes and finding his way to a
position ideally suited to the purpose of eavesdropping on their conversation,
Brown infringes the couple’s right to privacy. Yet the relevant barrier in
The Man in the Bushes is not solid; it is the air occupying the distance
between the bench and the path. This air represents a sound barrier through
which the sounds emitted by the couple cannot travel. In general, there
seems no limit to the variety of kinds of barriers that can be relied on by
those who seek to use them to protect their privacy. Such barriers include,
among many others, wall-safes, window blinds, nontransparent clothing,
desk drawers, masking agents (say, to cover the smell of alcohol or tobacco),
air (as a sound barrier), and the encryption of email messages.
Another question is whether the barrier that must be breached as a
condition of the infringement of someone’s right to privacy must have
been erected by, in addition to being used by, the relevant rightholder.
The answer, I take it, is no. For consider the following case:
My Wall
Michael does not want Mary to see him. So he hides behind my wall.
Mary trains her X-ray machine on my wall and thereby discovers
Michael hiding behind it.
I take it that in My Wall Mary infringes Michael’s right to privacy, even
though Michael himself did not erect the barrier he is using to hide from
her.
A further question is whether Y’s breaching of a barrier being used by
X to keep others from experiencing or learning personal facts about X

36.
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cannot count as an infringement of X’s right to privacy unless X’s use of
the barrier is itself morally permissible. The answer, I take it, is no. For
consider the following case:
The Towel Snatcher
Michael doesn’t want Mary to see him in his new bathing suit.
But there is no ready means to hide from Mary, so Michael
impermissibly snatches Jeff’s towel without Jeff’s permission and
hides behind it. Mary trains her X-ray machine on Jeff’s towel and
discovers Michael hiding behind it in his new bathing suit.
I take it that, in The Towel Snatcher, Mary yet again infringes Michael’s
right to privacy (this time by looking through Jeff’s towel), even though
Michael’s use of the towel without Jeff’s permission is morally
impermissible.37
A further question is whether the mere breaching of the relevant kind
of barrier—a breaching that does not in fact result in the experiencing or
discovery of any personal facts—is sufficient on its own to count as an
infringement of the right to privacy. The answer, I believe, is that it is
not. For consider the following variant on The Man in the Bushes:

37. Alan Rubel questions whether Y’s infringement of X’s right to privacy requires
that X actually use the relevant barrier to keep others from learning or experiencing some
personal fact about X. Rubel proposes the following interesting case (call it The Point of
Having Walls):
[Suppose B does not] use the walls of [his] house as a barrier to protect information.
[Perhaps B thinks] of them as a way to keep out the cold, displaying pictures,
and holding up the roof. Nonetheless, when A trains his X-ray device on [B’s]
wall and learns some personal fact about [B], it would surely be the case that A
has violated [B’s] right to privacy.
Alan Rubel, Some Questions for the Barrier Theory, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 806
(2007). My reaction to this is that, as stated, The Point of Having Walls is underdescribed.
For let us suppose that B spends months looking in vain for a glass house, and that B is
unable to raise enough money to build a glass house of his own. B then reluctantly buys
a house with nontransparent walls. When the case is described in this way, my intuition
is that A does not infringe B’s right to privacy when A acquires personal facts about B by
training an X-ray device on the walls of B’s house. It is only by illegitimately assimilating
this sort of case to the typical case (namely, one in which the relevant homeowner does
rely on the walls of his house to prevent others from acquiring personal facts about him)
that The Point of Having Walls could reasonably be thought to serve as a counterexample
to the Barrier Theory.

789

RICKLESS POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC

2/7/2008 2:57:26 PM

The Loud Woodpecker
The story is just as in The Man in the Bushes. The married couple
have repaired to an out-of-the-way park bench, and Brown has
hidden in the bushes behind the bench to listen in. Unfortunately,
just as the couple start to converse, a woodpecker begins to peck
loudly at a tree very close to Brown’s ears, and the sound of the
pecking drowns out the couple’s conversation.
In The Loud Woodpecker, Brown has clearly breached the sound barrier
on which the married couple are relying as a means to keep their
conversation from being overheard. Yet Brown has not infringed the
couple’s right to privacy because the woodpecker’s loud pecking has
prevented him from experiencing (or learning anything about) the
couple’s conversation. So Brown’s breaching of the relevant sound barrier
is not sufficient on its own to count as an infringement of the couple’s
right to privacy.38
Some theorists have proposed cases resembling The Loud Woodpecker
to establish the opposite result. Julie Inness proposes this case:
The Stranger on the Bus
[I]f I were seated on a bus, indulging in an innocent (though quiet) conversation
with a friend, and a stranger on the bus suddenly stuck her head between our
heads in a blatant attempt to hear the conversation, my privacy would be
violated even if the stranger heard nothing because of the abrupt cessation of the
conversation due to the intrusion.39

Inness’s point in The Stranger on the Bus is that the stranger has, at the
very least, infringed her and her friend’s right to privacy by attempting
to eavesdrop on the conversation, even if unsuccessfully. It may
38. Yet another question is whether a barrier breach that results in the extraction
and acquisition, but not in the actual experiencing, of personal facts is sufficient on its
own to count as an infringement of the right to privacy. To my mind, this is a borderline
case. To fix ideas, consider a variant of The Loud Woodpecker (call it The Tape
Recorder) in which Brown (i) manages to record the couple’s conversation on a portable
tape recorder that he has slipped under the bench on which they are sitting, (ii) escapes
with the tape of the conversation, but (iii) never listens to the tape. Has Brown infringed
the couple’s right to privacy in The Tape Recorder? The answer is, at the very least,
unobvious. My own reaction is to say that, even though Brown extracts and acquires the
relevant personal information by breaching a barrier on which the couple are relying to
prevent others from experiencing their conversation, he does not actually infringe the
couple’s right to privacy unless he actually listens to the tape. But I see room for
reasonable disagreement here. It may also be that our considered intuitions are simply
not fine-grained enough to distinguish between cases that, for compelling theoretical
reasons, ought to be distinguished. In any event, this sort of case merits further
discussion. Thanks to Alan Rubel for bringing this case to my attention.
39. INNESS, supra note 5, at 34.
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therefore seem as if the infringement of the right to privacy does not
require the actual acquisition of information or experience of a personal
nature. But, on reflection, The Stranger on the Bus establishes no such
thing. As I see it, the stranger has indeed infringed one of Inness’s rights;
but the right she has infringed is not the right to privacy, but the claim to
personal space. If I bring my face inches from yours (without your
permission), I have impermissibly “invaded your space.” The best way
to account for this is to suppose that you have a claim that I keep my
body at a reasonable distance from yours. This sort of claim is theoretically
distinct from the right to privacy. The moral here is that we should be
careful not to interpret every sort of wrong to a person that involves
bringing one’s body in close proximity to hers as an infringement of her
right to privacy.40
However, Inness also offers us a case that does not suffer from this
sort of problem:
The Stranger on the Train
[I]f I were on a train with closed compartments, and I noticed
someone sneaking up to take a look at me, my privacy would be
violated even if I managed to hide under the bed before the person
actually saw me.41
Inness’s point is that the stranger infringes her right to privacy even
though he does not see her, and even though he does not bring his body
in close proximity to hers. Although I agree, I deny that the case establishes
that the experiencing or learning of personal facts is not a necessary
condition of every infringement of the right to privacy. For I take it that
when the stranger nears the relevant train compartment, he is able to see
into it—perhaps by looking through the blinds—even if he does not spy
Inness herself. And when he sees into Inness’s compartment, he experiences
40. It is also worth noting that there is something morally wrong about the
eavesdropping attempts in The Loud Woodpecker and in The Stranger on the Bus, even if
neither constitutes an infringement of a right. It is no more permissible to unsuccessfully
attempt to violate a right than it is to succeed in violating it. Just as it would be wrong
for A to attempt to kill an innocent person even if A’s attempt is unsuccessful, so it is
wrong for Brown to attempt to listen in on the couple’s conversation in The Loud
Woodpecker even if his attempt is unsuccessful, and so it is wrong for the stranger to
attempt to listen in on the relevant conversation in The Stranger on the Bus. The moral
here is that the fact that a wrong has been committed does not entail that a right has been
violated.
41. INNESS, supra note 5, at 34.
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her compartment and acquires information about it. The stranger therefore
learns certain personal facts about Inness, and this is sufficient for his
breaching of the relevant barrier—in this case, the blinds—to count as an
infringement of Inness’s right to privacy. The moral here is that a
person need not actually experience—or acquire information about—
one’s body in order to infringe one’s right to privacy.
Some argue that the acquisition of personal information or experience
that is not also intimate does not rise to the level of an infringement of
the right to privacy. For example, Inness claims that “if a friend examines
my pen sitting on my desk, she usually does not violate my privacy . . . , but
if she examines my open diary on the desk, a privacy violation occurs.”42
Similarly, argues Inness,
if my friend came to the door of my house and, in pausing to think for a moment
before ringing the doorbell, heard me say “the,” I would not have grounds on
which to claim a privacy violation. But if that same friend stood in front of my
door for hours, straining to hear my quiet conversation inside, my privacy
would be violated (assuming I had not given her permission to listen).43

Now, as I see it, both pairs of cases are tricky, in part because they are
underdescribed. Consider the first pair involving the pen and the diary.
Suppose that I have invited my friend Lauren in to discuss some
personal matters and that we are now talking in my study. The phone
rings and I leave the room to answer it, inviting Lauren to look around
and make herself comfortable. Under these circumstances, if she walks
around my desk and examines either my pen or my open diary, she does
not infringe my right to privacy. For I have waived this right by inviting
her to look around the room. Now suppose that there is a thick velvet
curtain separating the seating area in my study, where Lauren and I are
now located, from the desk area. It is plain to Lauren that the purpose of
the curtain is to guard my privacy. The phone rings and I leave the
room, inviting Lauren to look around and make herself comfortable.
This time, however, Lauren pushes the thick velvet curtain aside, walks
around my desk, and examines both my pen and my open diary. Under
these circumstances, it appears that Lauren infringes my right to privacy
in respect of the pen as well as in respect of the diary. But my right to
privacy in respect of the pen (assuming that it is an ordinary pen with no
special properties) is so lacking in stringency as to be virtually trivial, at
least by comparison to my right to privacy in respect of the diary. For,
by the Aggravation Principle, a claim’s stringency varies with how bad

42.
43.
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its infringement would be for the claim holder.44 And here, we may
assume, it would be far worse for me to have Lauren become familiar
with the contents of my diary than it would be for her to become familiar
with the appearance, construction, or function of my perfectly ordinary
pen.
Consider now the second pair involving “the” and longer stretches of
intimate conversation. Suppose, to fill the case in a bit, that my friend
(say, Caroline), while at the door of my house and having paused
momentarily to gather her thoughts before ringing the doorbell, happens
to hear something far more intimate than “the.” Suppose she hears me
say that I am impotent. Has Caroline infringed my right to privacy? I
think not. I am aware that people (such as mail carriers, candidates for
public office, and many salespeople) often, and quite permissibly,
come to the door of my house and sometimes pause on the doorstep to
gather their thoughts (their mailbags, their campaign fliers, or their
solicitations) before ringing the bell. I am also aware of the fact that, if I
am speaking to someone in normal tones in the living room, even the
least curious visitor on my doorstep can hear what I say without effort.
Under these conditions, I have waived my right to privacy in respect of
my living room conversations. Thus, whether Caroline hears me say
“the” or “I am impotent” matters not in the slightest: the fact that
Caroline does not infringe my right to privacy derives not from the fact
that the information she acquires while on my doorstep is lacking in
intimacy, but rather from the fact that I have waived my right to privacy
in respect of conversations conducted within easy earshot of visitors on
my doorstep.
However, to fill in the case a bit differently, suppose that Caroline
presses her ear, or worse, an amplifying device, to the front door of my
house, and hears me say “the.” Under these conditions, it seems clear
that Caroline does indeed infringe my right to privacy, even if by doing
so she acquires no intimate information whatsoever. The reason why
Caroline’s behavior gives the appearance of falling below the infringement
threshold is that it leads to the acquisition of completely inconsequential
information. As in the second case of Lauren and the pen, though
Caroline infringes my right to privacy, the right she infringes is so
lacking in stringency as to be virtually trivial. So when the cases of
44. For a description of the Aggravation Principle, see supra notes 18–19 and
accompanying text.
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Lauren and Caroline are filled in, we see that they do not establish that
information acquired by breaching the relevant sort of barrier must be
intimate if the breach is to count as an infringement of the right to
privacy.45
With these various questions and worries about the Barrier Theory out
of the way, we may now return to the second part of Thomson’s interestingly
suggestive statement about the nature of the right to privacy. Thomson’s
claim is that “we have a right that certain uses shall not be made of
facts.”46 The “uses” Thomson has in mind here, as she later makes plain,
concern not the acquisition of experience or information of a personal
nature, but rather its dissemination. Which brings up the following question:
Under what sorts of circumstances, if any, does the dissemination of
personal information to others constitute an infringement of the right to
privacy?
Thomson herself provides an interesting (if ultimately, as I will argue,
unsuccessful) answer to this question. She considers two sorts of cases.
Here is the first case:

45. As a potential counterexample to the Barrier Theory, Alan Rubel proposes this
sort of case (call it The Shadow):
Suppose that A takes an interest in B. A follows B around as B goes about his
daily routine, and gathers data all the while. A notes the things B buys, the books B
checks out from the library. He casually eavesdrops on B’s conversations,
retrieves a bit of B’s hair from the barbershop floor and runs a quick DNA test.
He does the same to B’s spouse and children to check parentage. He conjures
pretexts to interview B’s friends, coworkers, and family to find out as many
details about B as he possibly can. Through A’s efforts he learns a great deal
about B’s life: his proclivities, his intellectual commitments, his political
views, details about his relationships, and so forth.
Rubel, supra note 37, at 804. Rubel claims that the Barrier Theory wrongly predicts that
A does not infringe B’s right to privacy in The Shadow. In reply, I would urge that this
prediction is not mistaken. Crucial to the evaluation of The Shadow is the fact that the
activities of B on the basis of which A gathers information about B are carried out in
public, and intentionally so. As I see the case, by conversing in public, purchasing items
in public, walking down a public street, and so on, B waives his right of privacy in
respect of the information that others might gather by watching his public behavior.
Furthermore, by voluntarily throwing out his hair, B has also waived his right to privacy
in respect of information that might be extracted from the hair, including color, consistency,
smell, cellular structure, and DNA. In addition, by voluntarily sharing information about
B with A in conversation, B’s friends have waived their right to privacy in respect of that
information. So I see no reason to suppose that A infringes B’s right to privacy in The
Shadow. In fact, the information-gathering activities in which A engages in the case are
typical of the information-gathering activities that are now used (I take it, permissibly)
by private detectives all over the world.
46. Thomson, supra note 1, at 128.
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The Picture in the News
[Matt] find[s] out by entirely legitimate means (e.g. from a third party who
breaks no confidence in telling [him]) that [Professor Jones] keep[s] a
pornographic picture in [his] wall-safe; . . . though [he] know[s] it will cause
[Professor Jones] distress, [Matt] print[s] the information in a box on the front
page of [his] newspaper, thinking it newsworthy: Professor Jones of State U.
Keeps Pornographic Picture in Wall-Safe!47

Thomson argues that it is reasonable to suppose, in accordance with her
“simplifying hypothesis,” that Professor Jones has “the right to not be
caused distress by the publication of personal information, which is one
of the rights which the right to privacy consists in . . . .”48 It follows
from this hypothesis that, in The Picture in the News, Matt infringes
Professor Jones’s right to privacy by disseminating legitimately acquired
personal information about Jones.49
Here is the second sort of case:
The Inveterate Gossip
Sally gives George information on the condition that he shall not
spread it. However, George spreads the information about Sally
anyway.50
Commenting on The Inveterate Gossip, Thomson writes that, in spreading
the information about Sally, George violates her “right to confidentiality,
whether the information is personal or impersonal.”51 However, she writes,
“If the information is personal, I suppose [George] also violate[s]
[Sally’s] right to privacy—by virtue of violating a right (the right to
confidentiality in respect of personal information) which is . . . one of the
rights which the right to privacy consists in . . . .”52

47. Id. at 129–30.
48. Id. at 130.
49. Thomson claims that Professor Jones’s right that Matt not print the information
about the contents of Jones’s wall-safe is overridden by “a more stringent right, namely
the public’s right to a press which prints any and all information, personal or impersonal,
which it deems newsworthy . . . .” Id. It follows, on Thomson’s analysis, that Matt’s
infringement of Professor Jones’s right to privacy does not also count as a violation of
this right.
50. Adapted from Thomson, supra note 1, at 129.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Suggestive as these cases are, I do not believe that they need be
analyzed as involving any infringement or violation of the right to
privacy. Consider The Picture in the News. It is true that Professor Jones
has “the right to not be caused distress by the publication of personal
information,”53 but I see no reason to suppose that this right is itself a
component of Jones’s right to privacy. Every moral fact about the case
that requires explanation can be explained on the hypothesis that Matt
infringes Professor Jones’s right to not be caused distress. As Thomson
herself points out: “Distress, after all, is the heart of the wrong (if there
is a wrong in such a case): a man who positively wants personal information
about himself printed in newspapers, and therefore makes plain he wants
it printed, is plainly not wronged when newspapers cater to his want.”54
Now consider The Inveterate Gossip. It is true that Sally possesses the
right to confidentiality in respect of personal information, but again I see
no reason to suppose that this right is itself a component of Sally’s right
to privacy. Every moral fact about the case that requires explanation can
be explained on the hypothesis that George infringes Sally’s right to
confidentiality. He has broken his promise, and may therefore be
responsible for any harm that comes to Sally as a result. That is all.
Now I do not think I can prove that Thomson’s analysis of these cases
is mistaken. The proper classification of wrongs is, to some extent, a
matter of theoretical choice. However, I see Thomson’s own classification
as insufficiently motivated, especially in light of the possibility of accounting
for acquisition cases (as opposed to dissemination cases) by means of a
nonreductionist theory that is on balance superior to Thomson’s reductionist
account. Thomson’s analysis of the two dissemination cases fits in well
with her reductionist claim that the right to privacy is a cluster-right
consisting of a wide variety of different sorts of rights, including property
rights and rights over the person. But if, as I have argued, her reductionist
analysis of acquisition cases succumbs to counterexamples, then it makes
more sense to use Occam’s razor and refuse to multiply rights beyond
necessity. If every moral fact about the dissemination cases can be explained
without adverting to a right to privacy, then let us simplify our moral
theory by hypothesizing that the right to privacy concerns the
acquisition, but not the dissemination, of personal information.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have been arguing that antireductionists are correct to insist that the
right to privacy plays an autonomous explanatory role in moral theory.
53.
54.
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Sometimes the infringement of a person’s right to privacy is not also the
infringement of a property right or right over the person, and provides
the rock bottom explanation of certain kinds of wrongs. But standard
antireductionist accounts of the right to privacy succumb to counterexamples
and miss what lies at the heart of the right. The right to privacy is a
claim, a claim that concerns not control over access to—or information
about—oneself, not accessibility, not the acquisition or dissemination of
undocumented personal information, but rather the experiencing or discovery
of personal facts about the rightholder via the breaching of barriers used
to keep others from experiencing or discovering these sorts of facts.
This is the core of the Barrier Theory I have defended as an alternative
to the standard accounts.
I want now to briefly consider what impact, if any, the Barrier Theory
might have on the classification of legal wrongs, especially under United
States law. I shall take it as a background assumption (unargued for
here) that the law should protect persons from at least the more serious
sorts of violations of the moral right to privacy precisely because they
are violations of this moral right. That is, the law should indeed recognize a
legal right to privacy.
There are two kinds of violations of the legal right to privacy: (i)
violations committed by private persons, and (ii) violations committed
by the government.55 Under current United States law, violations of the
first sort fall under the law of torts.56 But, at least as currently understood,
tort law in the area of privacy sweeps more broadly than it ought. Under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sections 652B–E, there are four
separate ways in which a person’s right to privacy may be invaded
(violated): (i) by intentionally intruding, physically or otherwise, in a
manner that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns (type
652B);57 (ii) by appropriating to one’s own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another (type 652C);58 (iii) by giving publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another, where the matter would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the
public (type 652D);59 or (iv) by knowingly or recklessly giving publicity
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 603 (1998).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
Id. § 652C.
Id. § 652D.

797

RICKLESS POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC

2/7/2008 2:57:26 PM

to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a
false light, where the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person (type 652E).60 As should be plain, it follows from the Barrier
Theory that privacy torts of types 652C–E do not in fact involve
infringements of the moral right to privacy, for they do not involve the
breaching of any barrier to the experiencing or learning of any personal
facts about the rightholder. Torts of type 652C are best understood as
violations of the right to property, while torts of types 652D–E are best
understood as violations of the right to not be caused distress.
Moreover, there are even “intrusion on seclusion” torts of type 652B that
should not be thought of as infringements of the right to privacy. For
section 652B treats any highly offensive intentional intrusion on a person’s
solitude or seclusion, whether or not it results in the experiencing or
discovery of any personal fact about her, as a privacy tort. And yet, as I
argued above, there are cases, such as The Loud Woodpecker, in which a
highly offensive barrier breach does not constitute an infringement of
anyone’s right to privacy.61 I conclude that, viewed from the standpoint
of moral theory, it is artificial and theoretically unmotivated to treat all
four 652 sections under the rubric of privacy. At best, the Barrier Theory
only countenances certain versions of the first (intrusion-on-seclusion)
kind of privacy tort as true infringements of the right to privacy.
What of violations of the second sort, that is, wrongs committed by
government agents acting in that capacity? Here, too, privacy law sweeps
far more broadly than it ought. As should be clear, I agree with those who
argue that the “constitutional” right to privacy that plays an important
role in U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the areas of contraception,
abortion, sex, child-rearing, and marriage is, in the Hohfeld-Thomson
framework, a liberty distinct from the claim that is the right to privacy.62
As I have argued, there is nothing to be gained, and much in the way of
theoretical clarity to be lost, by thinking of the right to privacy as a right
to make and carry out decisions with respect to activities of a private
nature. As I see it, the only constitutional provision that protects a person
against the government’s violation of his right to privacy is the Fourth

60. Id. § 652E.
61. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. It might be argued that privacy
tort law simply does not consider rights-infringements that do not result in some sort of
damage to the rightholder. On this view, barrier breaches of the relevant sort would not
count as intrusion-on-seclusion torts unless they resulted in the acquisition of damaging
experience or information. The principle that tort law does not range over inconsequential
rights-infringements therefore forces the Barrier Theory and section 652B to range over
the same sorts of wrongs. But this sort of extensional equivalence is purely accidental,
and does not follow directly from the definition of the intrusion-on-seclusion tort.
62. See, e.g., Parent, Privacy, supra note 7.
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Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches.63 When government
agents open my mail, break down my door, tap my telephone, or train
thermal imaging equipment on my property, they implicate the Fourth
Amendment by virtue of the fact that they are breaching barriers that I
am using to prevent others from experiencing or discovering personal facts
about me. Yet even here the Fourth Amendment protects against more
than just the violation of a person’s right to privacy, for the protection it
offers against government intrusions does not depend on whether such
intrusions yield experience or discovery of personal facts about the
rightholder. And, on the other side, there are government violations of a
person’s right to privacy against which the Fourth Amendment offers
little or no protection, inasmuch as the exclusionary rule (banning the
introduction at trial of evidence acquired by means of an unreasonable
search) does not apply to civil cases and cannot, even in criminal
matters, deter the government from violating a person’s right to privacy
if it does not plan to introduce the evidence acquired thereby in a
criminal case.
Privacy law is therefore best understood as having two basic components:
(i) a subclass of “intrusion on seclusion” torts concerning a private
person’s experiencing or discovering a personal fact about X by means
of a (highly offensive) breach of a barrier used by X to prevent others
from accessing personal facts, and (ii) a subclass of Fourth Amendment
violations concerning the government’s experiencing or discovering a
personal fact about X by means of a (not necessarily highly offensive)
breach of the same sort of barrier. If the idea is to provide theoretical
unity across the moral and legal realms in the area of privacy, then both
tort law and constitutional law stand in need of considerable revision.

63.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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